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ABSTRACT In recent years, physical layer security has been considered as an effective method to enhance
the information security beside the cryptographic techniques that are used in upper layers. In this paper,
we provide the security analysis for a two-way relay network, where the two sources can only communicate
through the intermediate relay nodes. In particular, we consider the scenario that there is an eavesdropper in
the vicinity of one source node. Both reliability and security aspects are taken into consideration in our work.
To enhance the reliability of communication, the intermediate relays are supplied with the energy harvested
from the sources’ radio frequency (RF) signals using hybrid time-switching and power splitting (TPSR)
protocol. Also, we apply the relay selection technique to select the best relay for the information exchange
between two sources. Regarding security, the secrecy of information is improved with the help of friendly
jammers nearby the eavesdropper. We provide the in-dept reliability and security analysis in terms of the
closed-form expressions of the outage probability (OP) at the source nodes, the intercept probability (IP)
at the eavesdropper, the secrecy outage probability (SOP), and the average secrecy capacity (ASC) of the
system. Finally, the Monte Carlo simulations are also conducted to verify the correctness of our analysis and
the effectiveness of the proposed scheme. Numerical results confirms that with the appropriate and feasible
choices of involved parameters, both outage OP and IP can be kept at small values to guarantee the reliable
and secure communication of the system.
INDEX TERMS Half-duplex, energy harvesting, decode-and-forward, two-way relay channel, physical layer
security, intercept probability, secrecy outage probability, average secrecy capacity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secrecy is always a critical issue in wireless communications
because of the information leakage resulting from the broad-
cast nature of the wireless medium. It leaves unprotected
information vulnerable. Besides conventional cryptographic
techniques to improve the security, the pioneering work by
Wyner [1] on the wiretap channel and subsequent
works [2], [3] show that the secrecy can also be guaranteed
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Marco Martalo .
along with reliability by introducing randomness in coding or
signaling to confuse the eavesdropper at the physical layer.
This is known as physical layer security (PLS). During the
last decade, PLS has experienced a resurgence of interest
from a lot of scientists [4] due to its potential to enhance
the quality of communication to satisfy the vast demand of
mobile users. PLS has been applied in relay networks [5],
cellular networks [6], [7], cognitive radio networks [8], IoT
networks [9], and massive multiple-input multiple-output
(MIMO) networks [10]. In multi-user networks, physical
layer security can be improved by node cooperation.
VOLUME 8, 2020 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 187165
D.-H. Ha et al.: Security and Reliability Analysis of a Two-Way Half-Duplex Wireless Relaying Network
Relay nodes can actively relay the source signal - cooperative
relay (CR) or passively jam the eavesdropper - cooperative
jamming (CJ).
In CR scheme, relay not only listens and forwards mes-
sages from the source to the destination, but also prevent the
information from leaking to eavesdroppers [5], [11]–[13].
For example, in [5], the authors proposed a generalized
multi-relay selection scheme to improve the security in a
cooperative relay network. They derived a semi-closed-form
expression of the secrecy outage probability (SOP) and
jointly optimize the power allocation factor and the number of
relay to minimize the SOP. On the other hand, relays in the CJ
scheme do not only forward the messages from the source to
the destinations, but also generate signals to interfere with the
eavesdroppers. CJ scheme includes artificial-noise (AN) and
noise forwarding (NF) schemes. In AN scheme, the coop-
erative jammers generate Gaussian AN to interfere with
the eavesdropper such as in [14]–[17]. In [15], the authors
conceived an AN aided two-way opportunistic relay selec-
tion scheme for enhancing the security of a two-way
multiple-relay network. For NF scheme, the helpers can
send dummy codewords which are independent of the source
messages and can be decoded reliably at the destination.
However, dummy codewords introduce extra randomness
at the observation of the eavesdropper, and the informa-
tion security is improved. This technique was introduced in
[11], [18]. Later, Chiang and Lehnert [19] jointly designed the
optimal co-variance matrices of the multiple-antenna signals
at the source and helper to maximize the secrecy rate of the
NF scheme. Recently, Lee and Khisti [20] exploited a NF
scheme to establish the secure degrees of-freedom of the
Gaussian diamond-wiretap channel with rate-limited relay
cooperation, where the eavesdropper not only listens the relay
transmission but also wiretaps some of communication links
among relays.
The concept of energy harvesting (EH), that represents the
direct using of available energy in the surroundings through
energy conversion from a given physical domain into elec-
tricity, has been raised a decade ago and is now an inten-
sive research and application field [21]. In fact, the main
focus for wireless networks has been shifted from spectral
efficiency and quality of service (QoS) constraints to energy
efficiency and green communication [22], especially in the
fifth generation (5G) and sixth generation (6G) networks to
reduce the power consumption [23]. Green and inexhaustible
energy resources such as solar, wind, thermal and mechan-
ical vibrations are currently considered for improving the
energy efficiency of energy-constrained networks such as
wireless sensor networks. Unfortunately, the collection of
these energy sources depends heavily on the environment.
Different from those above solutions, EH from RF signals
has emerged as a promising solution and attracted a lot of
attention in recent years, especially because RF signals can
be utilized for both energy and information transmission
simultaneously. This idea was first raised in the seminal paper
of Varshney in 2008 [24]. Since then, RF energy harvesting
has been developed mainly in three forms: wireless power
transfer (WPT) [25], wireless powered communication net-
work (WPCN) [26], and simultaneous wireless information
and power transfer (SWIPT) [27]. Nasir [28], [29] has sig-
nificantly contributed to the development of RF energy har-
vesting. He introduced two practical protocol for RF energy
harvesting in relay networks, namely time-switching relay-
ing (TSR) and power splitting relaying protocols (PSR) and
derived the analytical expression for key performance factor
such as outage probability, throughput, and ergodic capac-
ity for these protocols. In TSR technique, receiving node
switches in time between information processing and EH,
whereas, in PSRmethod, it splits the received power for infor-
mation processing and EH. Later, the hybrid time-switching
and power-splitting (TPSR) protocol was introduced and its
performance was evaluated in [30]. In recent years, the per-
formance of RF EH in various kind of wireless networks
and various communication schemes have been analyzed,
for instance, wireless sensor network [31], multi-hop relay
network [32], multiple-antenna network [33], cognitive radio
network [34], bidirectional relay network [35], mobile net-
works [36], and non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA)
scheme [37]. Especially, in 2020, Hoang et al. [38] analyzed
a two-hop single-relay networks using hybrid TPSR EH pro-
tocol in the presence of an eavesdropper near the relay. The
authors have derived the closed-form expressions of outage
probability and intercept probability in their model.
Two-way relay channel (TWRC), in which two users
exchange their messages with each other, has long been a
typical model to study the performance of novel communi-
cation methods, protocols, or algorithms, including the wire-
less energy harvesting technique, for several decades. The
classical two-way communication channel was first presented
in the seminal paper of Shannon [39] in 1961. During the
first decade of this century, research on TWRC has been
resurged by the paper of [40] and since then has drawn much
research attention again. In 2006, Katti et al. [41] proposed
the digital network coding scheme for TWRC, in which
the relay decodes the packets from different sources sepa-
rately and broadcasts the XOR-ed version of them to both
sources and saves one transmission time slot. Then in 2007,
Katti et al. [42] again presented and analog network coding,
in which the relays can receives signals from both source
simultaneously and then broadcasts the sum of two signals
back to the sources. This method even improves the through-
put of TWRC compared to digital network coding by saving
one more time slot of the communication. These two network
coding techniques have been the main focus of TWRC for
last decade. With the advance research of TWRC, the PLS
in spectrally-efficient TWR networks has been extensively
researched in the literature [6], [7], [14]–[16], [43]. In par-
ticular, Shukla [7] and Pandey and Yadav [6] investigated
the secrecy outage performance of a full-duplex cellular mul-
tiuser two-way amplify-and-forward relay network, where a
multiantenna base station using transmit antennas selection
communicates with one of the several users by the assistance
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of a relay in the presence of a passive eavesdropper that
employs maximal ratio combining.
Naturally, the application of wireless EH via RF signals
in TWCN have been well studied. In 2015, the authors
in [44] proposed and analyzed the EH transmission strate-
gies for TWRC to maximize the sum-throughput of the
system. In [45], the authors analyzed the performance
of a wireless-powered communication network, in which
a multiple-antenna two-way AF relay transfers power to
multi-pair of single antenna users and then helps the users
exchange their data. Zhou and Li [46] provided a jointly
optimal design of relay precoding matrices and power split-
ting ration to maximize the energy efficiency for SWIPT in
MIMO two-way amplify-and-forward relay networks, where
the relay harvests energy from both sources to forward
sources messages. An adaptive EH protocol for two-way
AF relay network over the Rician fading environment was
also introduced in [47]. On the other hand, partial relay
selection (PRS) has been selected as a simple but effective
method to enhance the reliability of data transmission at the
cooperative phase in EH-based two-way relay networks, such
as in [48].
To the best of our knowledge, the study of physical layer
security in RF EH-based networks have not been investi-
gated much in literature. The most recent results of PLS in
EH-based networks [38], which was published in early 2020,
only considered a simple relay network with single relay.
Motivated by these above facts, in this paper we provide a
thorough analysis on the reliability and security performance
of a two-way relay networks using the hybrid TPSR EH
protocol and PRS in the presence of an eavesdropper near
one of the source nodes. The main contributions of this paper
are summarized as follows:
– We derive the closed-form and semi-closed form expres-
sions of key performance factors for our proposed model,
including the outage probability (OP) of the legitimate com-
munications, the intercept probability of the eavesdropper
(IP), the secrecy outage probability of the system (SOP), and
the average secrecy capacity (ASC). In fact, this is a chal-
lenging problem because the probability analysis involves a
lot of random variables, which makes the derivation more
complicated.
– This work also provides an insightful analysis of the
effect of various system parameters on the reliability and
security performance. It is worth to notice that there should
be optimal values of the EH parameters like time-switching
factor and power splitting factor for each relay and jam-
mer configuration. It’s also concluded from the analysis that
increasing the number of available relay nodes can improve
the overall performance better than increasing the number of
jammers, except for very high values of transmit power.
– The correctness of our analysis is validated by Monte
Carlo simulations. From numerical results, we provide the
recommendation on selecting the configurations and appro-
priate values of system parameters to obtain the reliable and
secure transmission without paying too much for the com-
plexity of the system.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes the proposed two-way relay networks with hybrid
TPSR EH protocol and PRS. Then, the derivation of key
performance metrics, including OP, IP, SOP, and ASC of
the proposed model is presented in Section III. Section IV
shows the numerical results obtained from both analysis and
Monte Carlo simulations. Finally, some conclusions are given
in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. ENERGY HARVESTING AND SCHEDULING PROTOCOLS
Our proposed system model is illustrated by Fig. 1. Here,
we consider a multiple-relay (M relay nodes) two-way relay
networks, in which the relay nodes are equipped with RF
energy harvesting capability and help two sources A and B
exchange their information. The relay nodes are assumed
to be located in a cluster, that means the distances from
every available relay node to a source node are approximately
the same. This assumption is reasonable in practice, espe-
cially for IoT device networks or wireless sensor networks.
Partial relay selection is applied in our model, where only
the relay with best channel to the source (without loss of
generality, we consider the best channel gain to the source A)
FIGURE 1. System model of the proposed energy harvesting scheme.
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FIGURE 2. Energy harvesting and scheduling protocol for the proposed model.
is selected. All nodes in this model are single-antenna devices
and operates on half-duplex mode. For EH protocol, we apply
the hybrid time-switching and power-splitting (TPSR) proto-
col (see Fig. 2), which has been introduced in [49] and [50].
In this protocol, the information exchange between two
source nodes is accomplished after three distinct phases using
DF relaying strategy. For the first two phases, the sources A
and B take turns to broadcast their messages, say x1 and x2,
respectively, to the relay and the other source. Then in the
final phase, the relay combines two message (using XOR
operator) and broadcasts this XOR-ed message x⊕ = x1⊕ x2
to both sources. Now, each source, with knowledge about
its own message, can retrieve the desired message sent to
it. In this paper, we assume that the direct link between
two sources is not available for communicating due to long
distance and obstacles in surroundings such as buildings or
mountains. It’s worth noting that in this model, two phases are
enough for transmitting the data if we apply physical-layer
network coding (PNC) scheme [51], in which two sources
can transmit signal to the relay simultaneously to save one
time slot. However, for DF relaying, PNC requires that the
network coding message must be decoded from the super-
imposed signals in the first phase. So, the relay must either
have multi-user detection capability [52], or the source nodes
must use special coding so that the relay can decode a linear
combination of codewords from two source nodes [52], [53],
and this makes the system more complicated to implement.
Hence, we select the digital network coding scheme with
three time slots in this work.
Fig. 2 explains more details on the hybrid TPSR proto-
col. We exploit the first and second phases to supply the relay
with required energy from both A and B to help the relay
exchange data later. To do this, the relay node uses a power
divider to split the received signal in each source into two
portions: the first portion is used to extracted the energy and
stored at the relay, whereas the second portion of the signal
is used for decoding the information message. We denote β,
with 0 < β < 1, as the power splitting factor, i.e. the
proportion of the received power at the relay node that is
used for EH. For simplicity but without loss of practicality,
the power splitting factors for both sources’ signals are set to
be equal to each other. In addition, the durations of Phase 1
and Phase 2 of communication process are assumed to be the
same, which is equal to αT , where T is the total duration of
a single transmission block and 0 < α < 0.5 is the called the
time-switching factor. That means the duration of the final
phase is equal to (1− 2α)T .
Regarding the eavesdropping strategy, we intend to adopt a
single eavesdropper near each source to retrieve the informa-
tion transmited by that source, i.e. an eavedropper E1 in the
vicinity of the source A and an eavesdropper E2 in the vicinity
of the source B. In fact, eavesdropping strategy may involve
multiple eavesdroppers, however, more eavesdroppers
require higher cost and higher probability of being detected.
For two-way communications, many recent works have
considered single eavesdropper case, such as in [16], [43].
Regarding the position of eavesdropper, many scenarios may
be employed in practice: near the source(s) [54] or in the mid-
dle of the communication link [16]. For two-way communica-
tions, the analysis in [43] confirmed that the eavesdropper has
a better chance to eavesdrop the message when it is close to
one of the transmitters. Furthermore, in practical applications
such as in military or IoT sensor networks, the relay node is
not fixed, but can be changed among available nodes between
source and destination. Therefore, locating the eavesdropper
near one relay node may not be reasonable. To conclude,
our eavesdropping strategy are totally applicable in practice,
especially in military communications, where the eavesdrop-
per is usually put near each command center.
The eavesdropper E1 tries to retrieves the information sent
from A to any other node. Because E1 is close to A, it is
assumed that the direct link from the source B to E1 is not
available either. Therefore, even if it can receive the signal
from a relay node, it cannot remove the message sent by
B from the received signal. That means the signal received
from the relay node is not useful for the eavesdropper.
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Similarly, the eavesdropper E2 tries to retrieves the informa-
tion sent by B.Without loss of generality, we only consider E1
(from now on we denote as E for simplicity. To enhance
the security of communications, many friendly jammers are
used to suppress the received signal at the eavesdropper.
In particulars, when A broadcasts its message, the jammers
also transmit the artificial noise to the eavesdropper. This
artificial noise is known by the relay nodes, so we can ignore
any negative effect caused by this signal to the relay nodes.
Assume that the channels between two arbitrary nodes are
block Rayleigh fading, where channel coefficients remain
constant during one transmission block and change indepen-
dently across different transmission blocks. Let us denote
hX ,Y , for X ,Y ∈ {A,B,E,R1,R2, . . . ,RM , J1, J2, . . . , JK }
as the channel gain of the link from node X to node Y
(here, node Ri is the ith relay node and M is the number of
available relay nodes, Jk is the k th jamming node and K is
the number of jammers). In this paper, we assume that the
channels are reciprocal. Because the channels are Rayleigh
fading, the squared amplitudes of the channel gains such
as |hA,Ri |
2, |hB,Ri |
2, |hAE |2, etc. are exponential random vari-
ables (RVs) whose cumulative distribution function (CDF)
and probability density function (PDF) have the following
forms, respectively:
FX (x) = 1− e−λx (1)
fX (x) =
{
λe−λx if x ≥ 0
0 if x < 0
(2)
where λ is the mean of the exponential random variable X .
Nowwe are going through themathematical representation
for the entire process. As mentioned above, the source A
uses the first time slot to send its packet to both relay and
the second source B. The received signal at the relay R can be
expressed as
yA,Ri = hA,RixA + n
(1)
Ri , (3)
where E{|xA|2} = PA (PA represents the average trans-
mit power at A), E{·} denotes the expectation operator;
n(1)Ri denotes the zero-mean additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) with variances N0.
Using the power splitting technique, the energy that the
relay R can harvest from the RF signal of A is given by
ERi = ηβαTPA
∣∣hARi ∣∣2, (4)
where 0 < η ≤ 1 is the effective energy conversion efficiency
(which takes into account the energy loss by harvesting cir-
cuits and also by decoding and processing circuits).
In the second time slot, B transmits x2 to the relay
nodes Ri. Therefore, the received signals at the relay Ri can
be expressed as
yB,Ri = hB,RixB + n
(2)
Ri , (5)
where E{|xB|2} = PB is the average transmit power at the
B, n(2)Ri is zero-mean additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
with variance N0.
Adding to the received energy in the first phase, the total
harvested energy at the relay node R can be obtained as
ERi = ηβαT
(
PA
∣∣hARi ∣∣2 + PB∣∣hBRi ∣∣2) . (6)
For simplicity, we assume that the average transmit powers
from sources A and B are both equal to P. So, the equation (7)
can be rewritten as
ERi = ηβαTP
(∣∣hARi ∣∣2 + ∣∣hBRi ∣∣2) . (7)
In this work, we assume that the power consumption
for joint decoding and processing at relay is negligible as
compared to the power used for signal transmission as in
[26]–[29], [36], [37]. This assumption is justifiable because
power consumption for joint decoding and processing can
be estimated and budgeted while the energy required for RF
transmission increases with the transmission distance. Fur-
thermore, the deduction amount of harvested energy (to use
for decoding) can be counted as the reduction of the effective
energy efficiency η, so our analysis does not change if power
consumption for decoding and processing is considered. As a
result, the average transmit power of the relay node during
the third time slot can be given as
PRi =
ER
T (1− 2α)
=
ηβαTP
(∣∣hARi ∣∣2 + ∣∣hBRi ∣∣2)
T (1− 2α)
= κP
(∣∣hARi ∣∣2 + ∣∣hBRi ∣∣2) , (8)
where κ , ηβα1−2α .
The signals received at Ri from A and B will be decoded
and re-encoded by using the network coding scheme [55].
Let x̂A and x̂B denote the decoded messages from A and B,
respectively. Then during the third time slot, the relay uses
its power PRi to broadcast the exclusive-OR of the decoded
message xRi = x̂A⊕ x̂B to both sources A and B. The received
signals at A and B can be expressed, respectively, as
yA = hRiAxRi + nA,
yB = hRiBxRi + nB, (9)
where E
{∣∣xRi ∣∣2} = PRi ; nA and nB are i.i.d. AWGN noise
terms, which have zero mean and variance of N0.
From (3) and (5), the received SNRs at the relay for decod-
ing the messages xA and xB can be obtained respectively as
γARi =
(1− β)
∣∣hARi ∣∣2P
N0
= (1− β)
∣∣hARi ∣∣29, (10)
γBRi =
(1− β)
∣∣hBRi ∣∣2P
N0
= (1− β)
∣∣hBRi ∣∣29. (11)
where 9 , PN0 is the transmit-signal-power-to-noise-ratio.
In this paper, we assume that the channels are reciprocal,
so hBRi = hRiB and hARi = hRiA.
During the third phase, the source nodes A and B need
to decode successfully the received signal from the relay Ri,
then with the knowledge on its transmitted message, it can
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recover the message sent by the other source. Without loss of
generality, we can only consider the decoding performance at
the source B. The signal-to-noise-ratio at this node during the
third time-slot can be calculated as
γRiB =
∣∣hRiB∣∣2PR
N0
=
κP
(∣∣hARi ∣∣2 + ∣∣hBRi ∣∣2) ∣∣hRiB∣∣2
N0
= κ9
(∣∣hARi ∣∣2 + ∣∣hBRi ∣∣2) ∣∣hRiB∣∣2. (12)
For the DF relaying strategy at the relay, there is a minor
modification from the traditional protocol because digital
network coding is used in this case. Specifically, the trans-
mit message from the relay node during the third phase of
transmission block should depend on the decoding results of
x1 and x2 in the previous two phases. There are three possible
situations as follows.
(1) The relay successfully decodes both x1 and x2 in the
first two phases, then it will broadcast the message x1 ⊕ x2
during the third phase;
(2) The relay decodes x2 successfully but not x1. In this
case, it only broadcasts x1 during the third phase without
applying XOR operation;
(3) The relay cannot decode neither x1 nor x2, then no mes-
sage is broadcasted in the third phase and the communication
fails.
For both cases (1) and (2), both links from A to R and from
R to B must be good to ensure the communication by the
relayed path. Therefore, the equivalent signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) computed at the source B can be obtained as
γDF = min
{
γARi , γRiB
}
= 9 min
{
(1−β)
∣∣hARi ∣∣2, κ (∣∣hARi ∣∣2+∣∣hBRi ∣∣2) ∣∣hRiB∣∣2}.
(13)
Now, let’s consider the received signal at the eavesdrop-
pers. For simplicity, we only consider the eavesdropper at
A because of two reasons: (1) two eavesdroppers at A and
B cannot communicate together due to the long distance,
so their operations are independent; (2) the roles of these
two eavesdroppers are similar, so the intercept probability
analysis for one eavesdropper can be found by exchanging
A and B in the analysis for the other. The eavesdropper E1
tries to overhear the signals transmitted by A during the first
phase of our communication protocol. However, during this
phase, it also receives the artificial noises from theK jammers
(Jk , for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K ). It should be noted that we don’t
consider the overhearing of signal from the relay during the
broadcasting phase (third time slot) because the message sent
by the relay is a combination of messages from A and B.
Without knowledge of the message from B (it’s too far to
eavesdrop from B), the information from relay is just useless
to the eavesdropper (the signal from the relay nodes during
phase 3 is only useful for retrieving the message from B, but
for that purpose, the eavesdropper near B, i.e. E2, should do
better). As a result, the eavesdroppermust rely on the received
signal during phase 1, which can be expressed as
yE = hAExs +
K∑
k=1
hJkExk + nE , (14)
where xs is the message transmitted by A; xk is the arti-
ficial noise transmitted by the jammer Jk , which satisfies
E(|xk |2) = PJ is the transmit power of each jammer; and
nE is theAWGNnoise at E, which has zeromean and variance
of N0.
From (14), it is easy to derive the received signal-to-
interference-and-noise ratio SINR at the eavesdropper:
γE =
Ps|hAE |2
K∑
k=0
∣∣hJkE ∣∣2PJ + N0 =
9|hAE |2
K∑
k=1
∣∣hJkE ∣∣29J + 1 , (15)
where 9J ,
PJ
N0
.
Assume that the channels between two arbitrary nodes are
block Rayleigh fading [28], [29], [36], [45], where chan-
nel coefficients remain constant during one transmission
block and change independently across different transmission
blocks. Therefore, the channel power gains Xi =
∣∣hARi ∣∣2 =∣∣hRiA∣∣2, Yi = ∣∣hBRi ∣∣2 = ∣∣hRiB∣∣2, Z = |hAE |2, and T =∣∣hJkE ∣∣2 are independent exponential random variables (RVs)
whose cumulative density functions (CDFs) has the following
form:
FU (u) = 1− e−λuu, (16)
where U ∈ {Xi,Yi,Z ,T } and λu ∈ {λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4}, cor-
respondingly. To take path-loss into account, we can model
these parameters as λ1 = d
χ
1 , λ2 = d
χ
2 , λ3 = d
χ
3 , and
λ4 = d
χ
4 . Here, d1, d2, d3 and d4 are the link distances of
the A → Ri,B → Ri,A → E and E → Jk , respectively,
and χ is the path-loss exponent whose value may range from
2 to 6. For simplicity, we assume that all jammers are at
approximately equal distance to the eavesdropper. Similarly,
all relay nodes belong to a cluster such that the distances
from each source to all relay nodes are approximately the
same.
B. PARTIAL RELAY SELECTION
In our system, we apply the partial relay selection (PRS)
method1 to enhance the quality of communication. It means
that the cooperative relay can be selected among M relay
nodes by the following criterion:
Rb = argmax
{Ri:i=1,M}
∣∣hARi ∣∣2. (17)
In other words, the relay which provides the highest chan-
nel gain between itself and A in the third time slot is selected
for the cooperative communications.
1Another selection method is optimal relay selection (ORS), in which the
relay that maximizes the secrecy capacity is selected. ORS can provide better
performance, but we consider PRS here because its simplicity to implement
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Remark 1: In PRS protocol, it will require the channel sate
information (CSI) between A and the relay nodes. In practice,
A can estimate CSI via local control message and hence it can
be easily determine the best candidate as in (17). Moreover,
it is worth noting that without loss of generality, we assume
the relay is close to B than to A, so the relay selection should
be performed based on the quality of the first-hop links to
enhance the overall performance.
According to the result from the paper [56], the CDF and
PDF (probability density function) of X = |hARb |
2 can be
given by
FX (x) =
M∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
M
j
)
e−jλ1x (18)
and
fX (x) = λ1
M−1∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
M − 1
j
)
e−(j+1)λ1x . (19)
III. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we derive the key performance factors of our
proposed system, including outage probability (OP), inter-
cept probability (IP), secrecy outage probability (SOP) and
the average secrecy capacity (ASC)of the system.
A. OUTAGE PROBABILITY
First, we have the achievable data rate of the legitimate
communication link A→ B and the eavesdropper link given
respectively as
CB = (1− α)log2 (1+ γDF ) , (20)
CE = (1− α)log2 (1+ γE ) , (21)
where γDF is given by (13).
Assume that the relay node Rb is selected for the
cooperative communications and let X = |hARb |
2,
Y = |hBRi |
2, then we can rewrite the equivalent SNR at the
receiver B as
γDF = min {(1− β)X9, κ9 (X + Y )Y } . (22)
The outage probability occurs when the data rate of
the system exceeds the achievable data rate of the link,
i.e. CB < R, where R is the data transmission rate. Therefore,
it can be expressed as
OP = Pr {CB < R}
= Pr {min {(1− β)9X , κ9 (X + Y )Y } < γth} (23)
where γth , 2
R
(1−α) − 1 is the SNR threshold of B, which is
the solution of the equation CB = R.
Now we can state the Theorem 1 on the outage probability
of our proposed system as follows.
Theorem 1: The OP of the proposed two-way relay net-
works with partial relay selection and power-splitting energy
harvesting at relay nodes can be found as
OP = 1+
M∑
j=1
(−1)j
(
M
j
)
e−jλ1
γth
(1−β)9−λ2ξ
+
∞∑
n=0
M∑
j=1
(−1)j(jλ1 − λ2)n(jλ1γth)n+1λ2
n! (κ9)n+1
(
M
j
)
×0
(
−n− 1,
jλ1γth
κ9ξ
)
. (24)
where M is the number of available relay nodes, γth is
the SNR threshold of receiver, κ , ηβα1−2α , 9 ,
P
N0
,
ξ = 12
[√
γ 2th
(1−β)292
+
4γth
κ9
−
γth
(1−β)9
]
, and 0(s, x) ,
∞∫
x
ts−1e( − t)dt is the incomplete Gamma function.
Proof: We can rewrite the equation (23) as
OP = Pr {min {(1− β)9X , κ9 (X + Y )Y } < γth}
= 1− Pr {(1− β)9X ≥ γth, κ9 (X + Y )Y ≥ γth}
= 1− Pr
{
X ≥
γth
(1− β)9
,X ≥
γth
κ9Y
− Y
}
= 1− Pr
( γth
κ9Y
−Y ≥ γ̃th,X ≥
γth
κ9Y
− Y
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P1
−Pr
( γth
κ9Y
−Y ≤ γ̃th,X ≥ γ̃th
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P2
. (25)
where γ̃th ,
γth
(1−β)9 .
Let ξ = 12
√
(γ̃th)
2
+
4γth
κ9
− γ̃th
)
be the positive solution
of the equation γth
κ9y−y = γ̃th, the probability terms in (25)
can be rewritten as
P1 =
ξ∫
0
Pr
(
X ≥
γth
κ9y
− y
)
fY (y)dy
=
ξ∫
0
[
1− FX
(
γth
κ9y
− y
)]
fY (y)dy
= −
ξ∫
0

M∑
j=1
(−1)j
(
M
j
)
e
−jλ1
(
γth
κ9y−y
)fY (y)dy
= −
M∑
j=1
(−1)j
(
M
j
)
λ2
ξ∫
0
ey(jλ1−λ2)e−
jλ1γth
κ9y dy, (26)
P2 =
∞∫
ξ
Pr (X ≥ γ̃th) fY (y)dy =
∞∫
ξ
[
1− FX (γ̃th)
]
fY (y)dy
=
M∑
j=1
(−1)j+1
(
M
j
)
· e−jλ1γ̃th
∞∫
ξ
fY (y)dy
=
M∑
j=1
(−1)j+1
(
M
j
)
e−jλ1γ̃th−λ2ξ . (27)
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The integral in P1 can be solved by changing variable
t = 1/y and applying Taylor’s series expansion ex =
∞∑
n=0
xn
n!
for x = jλ1−λ2t :
P1 = −
M∑
j=1
(−1)j
(
M
j
)
λ2
∞∫
1/ξ
t−2e
(jλ1−λ2)
t e−j
λ1γtht
κ9 dt
= −
∞∑
n=0
M∑
j=1
(−1)j(jλ1 − λ2)nλ2
n!
(
M
j
) ∞∫
1/ξ
e−jλ1γtht
κ9tn+2
dt
=
∞∑
n=0
M∑
j=1
(−1)j+1(jλ1 − λ2)n(jλ1γth)n+1λ2
n!(κ9)n+1
(
M
j
)
×0
(
−n− 1,
jλ1γth
κ9ξ
)
. (28)
where the last equality comes from [57, 3.462.16].
By substituting (19), (27) and (28) into (25), we finally
get (24).
B. INTERCEPT PROBABILITY
The intercept probability at the eavesdropper E is defined
as the probability that capacity of the legitimate link falls
below the wiretap link’s capacity, i.e. CE > CB. By using
the result of the outage probability analysis, we obtain the
Theorem 2.
Theorem 2: The intercept probability at the eavesdrop-
per E in the proposed two-way relay networks with jamming
by artificial noise is given by (29), as shown at the bottom of
the page, where K is the number of jammers, 9 , PN0 , and
9J ,
PJ
N0
, and ξ̃x = 12
[√
x2
(1−β)2
+
4x
κ
−
x
(1−β)
]
.
Proof: By definition and using (13) and (15), the inter-
cept probability by the eavesdropper E can be found as
IP = Pr (CE ≥ CB) = Pr (γE ≥ γDF )
= Pr
(
Z
9JT + 1
≥ min {(1− β)X , κ (X + Y )Y }
)
.
(30)
where 9J , PJ/N0, Z = |hAE |2, T =
K∑
k=1
|hJkE |
2.
Let’s denote V = min {(1− β)X , κ (X + Y )Y } and
U = Z
9JT+1
. Then (30) can be rewritten as
IP = Pr (U ≥ V )
=
∞∫
0
fU (u)du
u∫
0
fV (v)dv =
∞∫
0
fU (u).FV (u)du. (31)
By using (15), the CDF of U can be written as
FU (u) = Pr {U ≤ u} = Pr
{
Z
9JT + 1
≤ u
}
= Pr {Z < u (T9J + 1)}
=
∞∫
0
FZ (u (t9J + 1)) fT (t)dt, (32)
where FZ (·) and fT (·) are the CDF of Z and PDF of T ,
respectively.
As mentioned in the previous section, Z is an exponen-
tial random variable with parameter λ3, while T is the sum
of K i.i.d. exponential random variable with parameter λ4.
As a result, the CDF of Z is given by (16) and T is a gamma
random variable with the parameters K and λ4, whose PDF
is given by [58]:
fT (t) =
λK4
(K − 1)!
tK−1e−λ4t . (33)
By substituting (16) and (37) into (32), we can rewrite
FU (u) as
FU (u) =
∞∫
0
FZ (u (t9J + 1)) fT (t)dt
=
∞∫
0
fT (t)dt −
λK4 e
−λ3u
(K − 1)!
∞∫
0
tK−1e−t(λ4+λ3u9J )dt
= 1−
λK4 0 (K ) e
−λ3u
(K − 1)!(λ4 + λ3u9J )K
= 1−
λK4 e
−λ3u
(λ4 + λ3u9J )K
, (34)
where the second last equality is obtained by using
[57, 3.381.4] and the last equality is obtained by replacing
0(K ) = (K − 1)!.
IP = 1+
∞∫
0

∞∑
n=0
M∑
j=1
(−1)j(jλ1 − λ2)n[jλ1x]n+1λ2
n!(κ)n+1
(
M
j
)
0
(
−n− 1,
jλ1x
κξ̃x
)
×
e−λ3x
[
(λ3)
29J
λ4
x + λ3 +
λ39JK
λ4
]
(
1+ λ39J x
λ4
)K+1 dx
+
∞∫
0

M∑
j=1
(−1)j
(
M
j
)
e−
jλ1(x)
(1−β)−λ2 ξ̃x
 e
−λ3x
[
(λ3)
29J
λ4
x + λ3 +
λ39JK
λ4
]
(
1+ λ39J x
λ4
)K+1 dx. (29)
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By taking the derivative of (38), we obtain the PDF of U
as
fU (u) =
e−λ3u
[
(λ3)
29J
λ4
u+ λ3 +
λ39JK
λ4
]
(
1+ λ3u9J
λ4
)K+1 . (35)
On the other hand, the CDF of V is obtained by using the
result of Theorem 1 (substituting γth by v9 in (24))
FV (v) = Pr (V ≤ v) = Pr
(γDF
9
≤ v
)
= 1+
M∑
j=1
(−1)j
(
M
j
)
e−
jλ1v
(1−β)−λ2 ξ̃v
+
∞∑
n=0
M∑
j=1
(−1)j(jλ1 − λ2)n(jλ1v)n+1λ2
n! (κ)n+1
(
M
j
)
×0
(
−n− 1,
jλ1v
κξ̃v
)
. (36)
where ξ̃v = 12
[√
v2
(1−β)2
+
4v
κ
−
v
(1−β)
]
.
By substituting (35) and (36) into (31), we obtain (29). The
proof is complete.
Remark 2: It can be seen from (29) that the intercept
probability does not depend on 9.
Remark 3: It is worth noting that our analytical results in
this paper can be easily extended to the general case when
there exist hardware noise terms at both relay and primary
transmitters. In fact, each SINR formula for the hardware
imperfection case is a one-to-one mapping of the correspond-
ing SINR for perfect hardware case presented above. For
example, the received signal at relay and its corresponding
SINR in hardware imperfection case can be rewritten respec-
tively as
yA,Ri = hA,Ri (xA + η
t
A)+ η
r
Ri + n
(1)
ri ,
γHIARi =
(1− β)
∣∣hARi ∣∣2P
|hARi |2 k
2
ARi
P+ N0
=
(1− β)
k2ARi +
1∣∣hARi ∣∣29
=
1
k2ARi
1−β +
1
γARi
.
where ηtA ∼ CN (0, (k
t
A)
2 P) and ηrRi ∼ CN (0, (k
r
Ri
)2 PRi )
are HI noise terms caused by the transmitter impairment at A
and receiver impairment at Ri, respectively; k2ARi = (k
t
A)
2
+
(k rRi )
2 denotes the aggregated HI level at both transmitter A
(k tA) and receiver Ri (k
r
Ri
) [59].
Then, to derive P(γHIARi < γth), we can use:
P(γHIARi < γth) = P
 1
k2ARi
1−β +
1
γARi
< γth

= P
(
γARi <
1− β − k2ARi
(1− β)γth
)
By replacing γth in our original analysis by
1−β−k2ARi
(1−β)γth
,
we can obtain the result for hardware imperfection case.
C. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
In the literature on physical layer security, such as [19],
the researchers are interested in the possibility of conveying
confidential messages at a positive rate, termed secrecy rate,
between a source and a legitimate destination while keeping
an eavesdropper ignorant if the source-destination channel
is better than the source-eavesdropper channel. In addition,
the larger the difference of the channel strengths between
the two channels, the higher the achieved secrecy rate. This
secrecy rate is defined as
Csec = max{CB − CE , 0}, (37)
where CB = (1− α)log2(1+ γDF ) is the achievable data rate
at the node B.
The secrecy rate must be maintained above certain
threshold to guarantee the confidentiality of the message.
An secrecy outage occurs if the achievable secrecy rate falls
below the threshold:
SOP = Pr {Csec < R} = Pr
{
1+ γDF
1+ γE
< γsc,th
}
, (38)
where R is the threshold of the secrecy rate, and γsc,th ,
2
R
(1−α) .
The closed-form expression of this SOP can be found in
the following theorem.
Theorem 3: The secrecy outage probability (SOP) of the
proposed two-way wireless relay networks with partial relay
selection, energy harvesting at relay nodes, and friendly jam-
mers is given by (39), as shown at the bottom of the next page,
where a = jλ1γsc,th(1−β)9 +
λ3
9
, b = λ39J
λ49
, γ̃ , 2
R
(1−α)−1 is the SNR
threshold at E, and 0 (s, x)
1
=
∞∫
x
ts−1e−tdt is the incomplete
gamma function.
Proof: To begin, we can rewrite (38) as
SOP = Pr
{
1+ γDF
1+ γE
< γsc,th
}
= Pr
{
γDF < (1+ γE )γsc,th − 1
}
=
∞∫
0
FγDF
(
(1+ x)γsc,th − 1
)
fγE (x)dx (40)
where FγDF (·) and fγE (·) are the CDF of γDF and PDF of γE ,
respectively.
By applying the result of Theorem 2 (just substitute u by
x
9
in (38)), the CDF and the PDF of γE can be found by
FγE (x) = Pr {γE < x} = 1−
e
−λ3x
9(
1+ λ39J x
9λ4
)K (41)
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and
fγE (x) =
dfγE
dx
=
e−
λ3x
9
[(
λ3
9
)2
9J
λ4
x + λ3
9
+
λ39JK
9λ4
]
(
1+ λ39J x
9λ4
)K+1 . (42)
On the other hand, the CDF of γDF is obtained by using the
result of Theorem 1 (substituting γth by y in (24))
FγDF (y) = 1+
M∑
j=1
(−1)j
(
M
j
)
e−jλ1
y
(1−β)9−λ2ξ
+
∞∑
n=0
M∑
j=1
(−1)j(jλ1 − λ2)n(jλ1y)n+1λ2
n! (κ9)n+1
(
M
j
)
×0
(
−n− 1,
jλ1y
κ9ξy
)
. (43)
where ξy = 12
[√
y2
(1−β)292
+
4y
κ9
−
y
(1−β)9
]
.
Let’s denote γ̃ , γsc,th − 1 and
4x = ξγsc,th(1+x)−1
=
√
(xγsc,th + γ̃ )2
4(1− β)292
+
(xγsc,th + γ̃ )
κ9
−
(xγsc,th + γ̃ )
2(1− β)9
.
Now, by substituting (43) with y = xγsc,th + γ̃ into (40),
we have (44), as shown at the bottom of the page. Finally,
by substituting (42) into (44), we get (39).
D. AVERAGE SECRECY CAPACITY
The secrecy capacity of the proposed system depends on the
SNRs of the legitimate link and the wire-tap link, which are
random variables. The average secrecy capacity is defined as
the expected value of the secrecy capacity [60]:
Cavg = E [CSec]
= (1− α)
∫∫
x,y>0
y≥x
log2
(
1+ y
1+ x
)
fγDF (y)fγE (x)dxdy
= (1− α)
∞∫
0
fγE (x)dx
∞∫
x
log2
(
1+y
1+x
)
fγDF (y)dy. (45)
where fγE (·) and fγDF (·) are the PDF of γE and γDF ,
respectively.
We now state the following theorem on the average secrecy
capacity of the proposed system.
Theorem 4: The average secrecy capacity Cavg of the pro-
posed two-way relay network with PRS, EH at relay nodes,
and friendly jammers is given by (46), as shown at the bottom
of the next page, where 3x
1
=
(
λ3
9
)2
9J
λ4
x + λ3
9
+
λ39JK
9λ4
and
ϒy ,
y
{(1−β)9}2
+
2
κ9
2
√(
y
(1−β)9
)2
+
4y
κ9
−
1
2(1−β)9 .
Proof: The CDF of γDF has been given in (43). By tak-
ing the derivative of (43), we get the PDF of γDF as (47),
as shown at the bottom of the next page, where the last
equality is obtained by using [61, 8.8.13], where ϒy ,
y
{(1−β)9}2
+
2
κ9
2
√(
y
(1−β)9
)2
+
4y
κ9
−
1
2(1−β)9 .
By substituting (47) and (42) into (45) we obtain (46).
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, some Monte Carlo simulations are presented
to validate the derived expressions of OP, IP, SOP, and
ASC. Moreover, the effect of various system parameters,
such as transmit-power-to-noise-ratio, time switching factor,
SOP = 1+
∞∫
0

∞∑
n=0
M∑
j=1
(−1)j(jλ1 − λ2)n
[
jλ1(γ̃ + γsc,thx)
]n+1
λ2
n!(κ9)n+1
(
M
j
)
0
(
−n− 1,
jλ1(γ̃ + γsc,thx)
κ94x
)
×
e−
λ3x
9
[(
λ3
9
)2
9J
λ4
x + λ3
9
+
λ39JK
9λ4
]
(
1+ λ39J x
9λ4
)K+1 dx
+
∞∫
0

M∑
j=1
(−1)j
(
M
j
)
e−
jλ1(γ̃+γsc,thx)
(1−β)9 −λ24x

e−
λ3x
9
[(
λ3
9
)2
9J
λ4
x + λ3
9
+
λ39JK
9λ4
]
(
1+ λ39J x
9λ4
)K+1 dx (39)
SOP =
∞∫
0
1+
∞∑
n=0
M∑
j=1
(−1)j(jλ1 − λ2)n
[
jλ1(γ̃ + γsc,thx)
]n+1
λ2
n!(κ9)n+1
(
M
j
)
0
(
−n− 1,
jλ1(γ̃ + γsc,thx)
κ94x
) fγE (x)dx
+
∞∫
0

M∑
j=1
(−1)j
(
M
j
)
e−
jλ1(γ̃+γsc,thx)
(1−β)9 −λ24x
 fγE (x)dx (44)
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power splitting factor, number of relay nodes, number of
jammers, and spectrum efficiency, on the system performance
is investigated through these simulation results. All Monte
Carlo simulations are generated using 105 samples of each
channel gain. The settings of simulation parameters are listed
in Table 1. Regarding to the channel settings, we adopt a
simplified path loss model, i.e., λi = d
χ
i , for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4},
where d1, d2, d3, d4 are the distances between A and the relay
cluster, between B and the relay cluster, between A and the
eavesdropper, and between the eavesdropper and the jam-
ming cluster, respectively; χ denotes the path loss exponent,
respectively. For illustrative purpose, we set d1i = 0.85,
d2 = 0.5, d3 = d4 = 2, and χ = 2, which leads to the
values of λi, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} as in Table 1.
Firstly, we examine the reliability and security perfor-
mance of the proposed model in terms of outage probability
and intercept probability. Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 plot OP and IP
versus the ratio between transmission power of the source A
and the noise power density N0, which is denoted by 9, for
four different cluster size of the relay cluster and jamming
clusters. It can be seen from these figures that the analytical
results and the simulation results exactly match together.
As expected, OP decreases with 9, while the IP does not
depend on 9 as stated in the Remark 3. It can also be
observed that the both reliability and security performance
can be improved by increasing the number of relay nodes and
jammer nodes. However, when the number of relay nodes is
sufficient, adding more nodes to the relay cluster does not
TABLE 1. Simulation parameters.
significantly improve the outage performance (we can see the
gaps among the casesM = 3,M = 5, andM = 7 are small).
This can be explained as follows. Because the relays are
located in a cluster, they are closed to each other. With partial
relay selection, the more relays added to the cluster, the less
likely that the newly added relay has best channel gain. After
a certain number of relays, keep increasing the number of
relays does not improve much. So, it is recommended that we
use a moderate number of relays, let’s say M = 3, and use
cooperative jammers, for example K = 2, to obtain a desired
performance.
Cavg = (1− α)
∞∑
n=0
M∑
j=1
(−1)j(jλ1 − λ2)nλ2
n!
(
M
j
) ∞∫
0
(n+ 1)e−
λ3x
9 3x(
1+ λ39J x
9λ4
)K+1 dx
∞∫
x
log2
(
1+ y
1+ x
)
×
[
yn(jλ1)n+1
(κ9)n+1
0
(
−n− 1,
jλ1y
κ9ξy
)]
dy
− (1− α)
∞∑
n=0
M∑
j=1
(−1)j(jλ1 − λ2)nλ2
n!
(
M
j
) ∞∫
0
e−
λ3x
9 3x(
1+ λ39J x
9λ4
)K+1 dx
∞∫
x
log2
(
1+ y
1+ x
)[
e
−jλ1y
κ9ξy ξn+1y
(
1
y
−
ϒy
ξy
)]
dy
+ (1− α)
M∑
j=1
(−1)j+1
(
M
j
) ∞∫
0
e−
λ3x
9 3x(
1+ λ39J x
9λ4
)K+1 dx
∞∫
x
log2
(
1+ y
1+ x
)
e
−
[
jλ1y
(1−β)9+λ2ξy
] [
jλ1
(1− β)9
+ λ2ϒy
]
dy (46)
fγDF (y) =
∂FγDF (y)
∂y
=
∞∑
n=0
M∑
j=1
(−1)j(jλ1 − λ2)n(jλ1)n+1λ2
n!(κ9)n+1
(
M
j
)
∂
∂y
[
yn+10
(
−n− 1,
jλ1y
κ9ξy
)]
+
M∑
j=1
(−1)j
(
M
j
)
∂
∂y
[
e
−jλ1y
(1−β)9−λ2ξy
]
=
∞∑
n=0
M∑
j=1
(−1)j(jλ1 − λ2)nλ2
n!
(
M
j
)[
(n+ 1)yn(jλ1)n+1
(κ9)n+1
0
(
−n− 1,
jλ1y
κ9ξy
)
− e
−jλ1y
κ9ξy ξn+1y
(
1
y
−
ϒy
ξy
)]
+
M∑
j=1
(−1)j+1
(
M
j
)
e
−
[
jλ1y
(1−β)9+λ2ξy
] [
jλ1
(1− β)9
+ λ2ϒy
]
. (47)
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FIGURE 3. Outage probability of A → B link versus
transmit-power-to-noise-ratio for different number of relays.
FIGURE 4. Intercept probability versus transmit-power-to-noise-ratio for
different number of jammers and jammer power levels.
FIGURE 5. Outage probability of A → B link versus time-switching factor
for different number of relays.
The effect of the EH time-switching factor on the outage
and security performance is shown in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6.
We consider again four cluster sizes of the relay and jammer
clusters, i.e., M ∈ {1, 3, 5, 7},K ∈ {1, 2, 3}. As observed
FIGURE 6. Intercept probability of A → B link versus time-switching
factor for different number of jammers and jammer power levels.
from Fig. 5, OP decreases with α. This can be explained as
follows. For smallα, the EH time is limited, so the relay nodes
do not harvest much energy for their transmission. Therefore,
increasing α would improve the quality of transmission.
Again, it can be seen that increasing the number of relays
M ≥ 3 does not improve much on performance. On other
aspect, Fig. 6 shows that IP decreases with α. It is obvious
because increasing α means increasing the duration of energy
harvesting time by the relay, which results in the better
legitimate link condition, while the wire-tap link condition
is not improved by increasing α. From these two figures, it is
recommended that we choose α large enough and choose a
proper number of jammers (for example, K = 2) and relays
(for example, M = 3). Adding more jammers and relays
after these certain numbers cannot bring significant benefit.
In addition, the transmit power of jammer is not necessarily
too large, with 9J =5 dB and with sufficient large α, we can
achieve an acceptable performance.
Fig. 7 plots the OP versus the power-splitting factor β.
There is a trade-off between the energy using to supply the
FIGURE 7. Outage probability of A → B link versus power-splitting factor
for different number of relays.
187176 VOLUME 8, 2020
D.-H. Ha et al.: Security and Reliability Analysis of a Two-Way Half-Duplex Wireless Relaying Network
relay nodes and to guarantee the transmission of the message
from source A. That means there exists an optimal β to
minimize the OP for each number of relay nodes. When the
number of relay nodes is increased, the optimal value of
β tend to approach 1 (β = 0.46, 0.87, 0.95, and 0.97 for
M = 1, 3, 5, and 7, respectively). This is because when the
number of relays increases, the quality of the link between A
and the selected relay nodes is improved so that we do not
worry much about the transmit power for message signal and
can use more energy to supply the relay node.
The intercept probability is also affected by β as shown
in Fig. 8. It is reasonable to see that there is also an optimal
value of β that minimize the IP for each scenario. This is
because the wiretap-link condition does not depend on β,
while the OP of the main link from A → B get a single
minimum at shown in Fig. 8. However, it is worth noting that
the optimal value of β for minimizing IP is different from the
one that minimizing OP. In fact, the optimal β in this case
(minimizing IP should depend on the number of jammers,
too, and also tend to increases when the number of jammers
increases. In particular, the optimal values of β∗ for K =
1, 2, 3 and 9J =5 dB are 0.49, 0.53, and 0.56 respectively.
For 9J = 15 dB, the optimal values β∗ for K = 1, 2, 3 are
0.56, 0.66, and 0.73, respectively. Here, because α is not large
enough, the IP is significantly impacted by 9J .
FIGURE 8. Intercept probability of A → B link versus spectrum efficiency
for different number of jammers and jammer power levels.
Figures 9, 10, and 11 depicts the impact of various param-
eters on the secrecy outage performance of our proposed
systems. It’s worth noting that in these three figures, all
analytical curvesmatch perfectly with the corresponding sim-
ulation curves, which validate the correctness of our analy-
sis. In Fig. 9, we can observe that SOP decreases when 9
increases, similar to OP in 3 but faster. It is interesting to note
that there always exists an outage floor in each simulation
case. That means when9 is large enough, the increasing of9
does not result in notably change in SOP. This floor is lower
when more relay nodes and jammer nodes are considered
for helping. In Fig. 9, Fig. 10, and Fig. 11, the SOP for
optimal relay selection (ORS) is also given by simulation as a
FIGURE 9. Secrecy outage probability of the proposed system versus
transmit-power-to-noise-ratio for different configurations of relay and
jammer nodes.
FIGURE 10. Secrecy outage probability of the proposed system versus
time-switching factor for different configurations of relay and jammer
nodes.
FIGURE 11. Secrecy outage probability of the proposed system versus
power splitting factor for different configurations of relay and jammer
nodes.
benchmark to compare with the partial relay selection (PRS)
strategy. However, in this paper, we prefer PRS because its
simplicity to implement.
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Fig. 10 shows the effect of time-switching factor α
on the secrecy performance. The SOP tends to decreases
when α increases. Please note that the secrecy rate in
this case is defined as difference in capacity between the
source-relay link and the source-eavesdropper link. When
α increases, the outage performance of source-relay link
is slightly degraded because the SINR threshold increases,
while the performance of relay-destination link is signifi-
cantly improved due to higher harvested energy and smaller
transmission time (so, transmit power becomes larger).
On the other hand, increasing α does not improve the capacity
of the source-eavesdropper link. That’s why SOP decreases
with α. It is shown in Fig. 10 that K = 2,M = 3 should be
an appropriate choice for the numbers of relays and jammers,
respectively.
As expected, there exists an optimal value of power split-
ting factor β that minimizes SOP, as shown in Fig. 11. This
can be explained by the same argument as in Fig. 8. We can
also observe that the optimal value of β increases from the
scheme with less relays and jammers to the scheme with
larger number of relays and jammers. Specifically, the opti-
mal values of β for the cases K = M = 1, K = 2,M = 1,
K = 1,M = 3, and K = 2,M = 3 are 0.375, 0.4, 0.55,
and 0.65 respectively. It’s difficult to derive the closed-form
formula for the optimal value of β, which is the solution of
the equation ∂(SOP)
∂β
= 0 because the integral form of SOP.
However, because the SOP is a single-minimum functionwith
respect to β, it is easy to develop an iterative algorithm to find
the optimal β numerically, for example, using Golden section
search algorithm [62]. The 3-D plot of SOP function versus α
and β for the case that K = 2 andM = 3 is shown in Fig. 12.
We can find the global mimimum of SOP, which is equal to
0.00168, obtained as α approaches 0.5 and β = 0.34.2
FIGURE 12. 3-D graph of SOP of A → B link versus α and β.
The average secrecy capacity (ASC) of the proposed sys-
tem is illustrated in Figures 13, 14, and 15. First, we can
see that ASC increases with the transmit-power-to-noise ratio
2An adaptive TPSR protocol, in which α and β are regularly and optimally
updated according to the channel states, can be implemented, with the
tradeoff on complexity and cost.
FIGURE 13. Average secrecy capacity of A versus transmit-power-
to-noise-ratio for different configurations of relays and jammers.
FIGURE 14. Average secrecy capacity of A versus time-switching factor α
for different configurations of relays and jammers.
FIGURE 15. Average secrecy capacity of A versus power splitting factor β
for different configurations of relays and jammers.
(SINR) in Fig. 13. It is obvious that the secrecy capacity is
improved if we add more available-to-help relay nodes and
more jammers. It seems that adding more available relay can
bring more improvement that adding jammers, except for
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sufficiently high SINR regime, which makes the source-relay
communications good enough. Secondly, the ASC is a con-
cave function with respect to the time-switching factor α,
which can be explained as follows. For small α, the trans-
mission duration is large enough, while the SOP decreases
with α as we explained in Fig. 10, so the ASC increases
with α. However, when α passed some certain threshold,
the transmission time becomes smaller and has bad impact on
the overall capacity. So the ASC starts to decrease. As seen
from 14, the optimal α for 4 considered cases are very close
together (around 0.17). Again, adding more available relays
or adding more jammers can improve the ASC, where the
former is better because here we have 9 = 15 dB. For the
impact of power-splitting factor β, it is easily to see that larger
β results in smaller ASC because in (46), increasing β leads
to decreasing of the exponential terms and then the decreasing
of ASC. By intuition, increasing β makes the chance of suc-
cessful decoding the message at relay reduced, so the overall
capacity is reduced. Fig. 15 confirms this argument, as we see
that ASC falls to zero when β approaches 1. Again, theMonte
Carlo simulations here confirms the analytical results.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a two-way half-duplex wireless
relay networks in Rayleigh fading environment with partial
relay selection and hybrid-TPSR-based EH at relay node,
in which there is an eavesdropper in the vicinity of one
source node. To enhance the security of the networks, some
friendly jammers are employed to degrade the received sig-
nals at eavesdropper. We derive the closed-form expres-
sion of outage probability at the legitimate destination node,
the intercept probability at eavesdropper, the secrecy outage
probability, and the average secrecy capacity of the system.
All analytical results are verified by Monte Carlo simula-
tions. From the numerical results, we show that adding more
available-to-help relay nodes or adding more jammers can
improve the reliability and security performance of the sys-
tem significantly, in which the former method can provide
larger improvement in average-to-high SINR regime. For
very high SINR, adding more jammers would be more bene-
ficial. Secondly, there exists a unique optimal value for either
time-switching or power splitting factor to minimize the out-
age probability, while the intercept probability increases with
time-switching factor but does not depend on power splitting
factor. For the secrecy outage probability, there may exist
an outage floor if M and K is small. Therefore, it’s recom-
mended that we select α around 0.3 with M = 3 relay nodes
and K = 5 or 7 jammers to obtain the desired performance
but not to complicate the system. The results of this paper can
find good applications in military communications as well as
in IoT networks for smart cities, where the security of the
messages is utmost important. For future work, we can extend
the analysis to the case that multiple antennas are equipped at
source nodes or eavesdroppers.
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